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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Comment argues that the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)1 may 
serve as a jurisdictional basis for claims of international 
copyright infringement occurring outside of the United States.2
While the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain3 restricts the class of claims that may invoke ATS 
jurisdiction, Sosa does not foreclose such jurisdiction for new 
claims based upon customary international law.4 Rather, Sosa
requires that future ATS claims meet definitional “specificity” 
requirements, and enjoy international acceptance.5
1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
2 See Discussion infra Part III. 
3 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
4 See id., 542 U.S. at 729 (concluding that ATS jurisdiction 
remains available to only a “narrow class” of such claims); see 
also Anupam Chander, Symposium: On Democratic Ground: New 
Perspectives on John Hart Ely: Democracy and Distrust: 
Globalization and Distrust, 114 Yale L.J. 1193, 1209 (2005) 
(arguing that courts should embrace their post-Sosa function of 
promulgating federal common law under the ATS, given the 
institutional advantages of the judiciary vis-à-vis the more 
political branches of government). 
5 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (requiring that claims under the ATS 
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Over the past century, the international community’s 
concerted efforts to protect the copyrights of aliens have 
resulted in a fixture of normative international law. 
Specifically, through the pervasive and long-standing acceptance 
of multilateral intellectual property agreements, such as the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (“Berne Convention”)6 and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”),7
principles of transnational copyright protection have risen to 
the level of customary international law.8 Because the global 
 
exhibit a specificity-of-definition comparable to three 
paradigmatic principles of the law of nations as characterized 
by Blackstone, and be “accepted by the civilized world”). 
6 Berne Convention for The Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne]. 
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, (1994), 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
8 Cf. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 162 (2d Cir. 
2003) (stating that treaties and other international agreements 
may provide the basis for customary international law); 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
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norm of protecting aliens’ copyrights meets the specificity-of-
definition and universality-of-acceptance requirements of Sosa,9
claims of international, extraterritorial copyright infringement 
may secure jurisdiction under the ATS. 
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the legal 
environment out of which the normative principle of 
international copyright protection grew.10 It describes the 
history and present-day application of the ATS,11 the major 
international agreements that have laid the foundation for the 
international norm of international copyright protection,12 the 
nature of the problem of international copyright infringement,13 
and pertinent post-Sosa ATS litigation.14 
Part III of this Comment assesses whether a claim of 
 
States § 102(3) (1987) (stating that customary international law 
may be derived from multilateral agreements). 
9 See supra note 5 (providing the two requirements that Sosa
imposes for future ATS claims resting upon customary 
international law). 
10 See Background infra Part II.C. 
11 See Background infra Part II.A.  
12 See Background infra Part II.B. 
13 See Background infra Part II.C. 
14 See Background infra Part II.D. 
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international, extraterritorial copyright infringement can 
establish ATS jurisdiction in light of Sosa. It concludes that 
such a claim passes each of Sosa’s tests, and thus may secure 
subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.15 
Part IV outlines a study that the United States Copyright 
Office should undertake in collaboration with Congress.16 While 
performing the study, the Copyright Office should solicit and 
consider the views of a wide range of artists17 and organizations 
concerned with intellectual property.18 Upon completion of the 
study, Congress should determine whether to preserve the ATS as 
it currently stands, or amend it to eliminate jurisdiction for 
claims of international, extraterritorial copyright 
infringement.19 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 The conception of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)20 is 
 
15 See Discussion infra Part III. 
16 See Recommendations infra Part IV. 
17 See Recommendations infra Part IV.C. 
18 See Recommendations infra Part IV.A. 
19 See Recommendations infra Part IV.D. 
20 See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126, at 
*1, n.1 (D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005) (deciding to call the statute the 
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traceable to a scuffle between a French diplomat and an 
adventurer in Philadelphia in 1784.21 Following the brawl, the 
First Congress was concerned that the United States’s inability 
to prosecute the aggressors in such incidents would embarrass 
the young nation on the world stage.22 Despite its sensational 
origins, the ATS was sparsely litigated and nearly forgotten 
since its passage as part of the 1789 Judiciary Act.23 More than 
 
Alien Tort Statute, although some courts call it instead the 
Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”)). 
21 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716-17 (describing Congress’s passage of 
the ATS as a response to the so-called “Marbois incident of May 
1794” and Congress’s perceived self-incapacity to take effective 
countermeasures). 
22 See id.; see also Genc Trnavci, The Meaning and Scope of the 
Law of Nations in the Context of the Alien Tort Claims Act and 
International Law, 26 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 193, 225-26 
(2005) (describing one version of the ATS’s genesis as based on 
the Framers’ and the First Congress’s concerns that the states 
might inadequately enforce the law of nations with respect to 
affronts on foreign diplomats, and thus cause international 
embarrassment for the fledgling country). 
23 See Ryan Micallef, Note, Liability Laundering and Denial of 
Justice Conflicts Between the Alien Tort Statute and the 
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two centuries later, the ATS remains essentially unchanged,24 and 
currently provides jurisdiction for tort claims brought by 
aliens that amount to violations of international law.25 
Given the adverse impact of international copyright 
infringement, in both its creative26 and economic27 dimensions, 
 
Government Contractor Defense, 71 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1375, 1377 
(2006) (referring to the ATS as little litigated and nearly 
“dormant” for almost 200 years); Carolyn A. D'Amore, Note, Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain and the Alien Tort Statute: How Wide Has the 
Door to Human Rights Litigation Been Left Open?, 39 Akron L. 
Rev. 593, 600 (2006) (noting that the ATS was “essentially 
unused” during almost two centuries of existence); Donald 
Francis Donovan and Anthea Roberts, Note, The Emerging 
Recognition Of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 A.J.I.L. 142, 
146 (2006) (describing the ATS as “largely dormant” until 1980, 
and only receiving a thorough treatment in the Supreme Court’s 
2004 Sosa decision). 
24 See Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 372 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(observing that the ATS was “[o]n the books since the First 
Judiciary Act of 1789” and has remained “essentially unchanged 
since then”). 
25 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
26 Cf. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (justifying the protections 
7
the ATS has the potential to promote artistic creation and 
strengthen the Unites States economy.28 By providing subject 
matter jurisdiction for suits against foreign entities that 
infringe the copyrights of aliens as well as Americans, the ATS 
can indirectly protect the copyrights of Americans.29 
of patents and copyrights in terms of their ability “ [t]o 
promote the progress of science and useful arts”). 
27 See, Frank Ahrens, Hollywood Says Piracy Has Ripple Effect,
Washington Post, Sept. 29, 2006, at D05 (commenting on 
Hollywood’s assessment of the evils of movie “piracy,” and 
noting that internet-based piracy can be particularly difficult 
to combat); Piracy ‘threatens 600,000 jobs’, BBC News, Jan. 20, 
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/2676117.stm 
(warning that international copyright infringement may 
jeopardize the jobs of over 600,000 individuals in Europe). 
28 See Office of United States Trade Representative, Strategy 
Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP!) (2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/June/US
_Exps_Outreach_in_Campaign_to_STOP!_Trade_in_Fakes.html 
[hereinafter 2004 Strategy] (stating that global piracy of 
copyrighted American goods may weaken America’s technology-
driven economy and the competitiveness of American companies). 
29 Cf. United States Trade Representative 2006 Special 301 Report 
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Additionally, by permitting suits against foreign entities that 
infringe only aliens’ copyrighted works, the ATS can help quash 
foreign piracy markets, and thereby secure the copyrights of 
Americans. 
A. The Alien Tort Statute: Origins and Interpretation in  
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
The ATS was passed by the First Congress in 178930 and has 
evolved only slightly over the years.31 The statute reads: “The 
 
(Apr. 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Li 
brary/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Special_301_Review/asset_up
load_file473_9336.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Report] (identifying 
markets for infringing goods as a cause of global piracy, and 
recognizing that quashing such markets may reduce global 
piracy). 
30 See generally Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 
73, 77 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350) (providing 
text of the original act, under which the district courts “... 
shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the 
several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of 
all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.". 
31 See supra, note 24 (describing how only minimal changes have 
been made to the ATS since its passage). 
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district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”32 Only one 
case33 has been able to successfully establish jurisdiction under 
the ATS in the statute’s first 170 years of existence.34 
The ATS was revived from dormancy by a wave of human rights 
litigation the 1980s, beginning with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,35 a 
 
32 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
33 See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) 
(establishing ATS jurisdiction in a suit concerning the 
disposition of slaves aboard a Spanish ship that was captured by 
a privateer). 
34 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712, 720 (stating that, for more than 
170 years after its passage, the ATS furnished jurisdiction only 
once). 
35 See Terry Collingsworth, Boundaries in the Field of Human 
Rights: The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement 
Mechanisms, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 183, 186 (2002) (describing 
the rebirth of the “long-dormant” ATS as commencing with 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, and recognizing the ATS’s subsequent 
use as a tool in international human rights litigation); Curtis 
A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 Va. J. 
Int'l L. 587, 588-89 (2002) (observing that ATS was inactive 
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case alleging wrongful death in violation of the United Nations 
Charter.36 Subsequently, cases alleging false arrest,37 rape,38 
murder,39 slavery,40 genocide,41 war crimes,42 crimes against 
 
until Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, after which it served as a 
vehicle for international human rights advocacy). 
36 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(listing the bases for the plaintiffs’ claims, which included 
U.S. wrongful death statutes, the U.N. Charter, the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the U.N. Declaration Against 
Torture, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man, and other human rights declarations and principles of 
normative international law). 
37 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692 (denying ATS jurisdiction for a 
claim of “‘arbitrary’ detention”). 
38 John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(permitting ATS jurisdiction for claims of, among other things, 
aiding and abetting rape). 
39 See id. (granting ATS jurisdiction for claims of aiding and 
abetting murder). 
40 See id. at 947 (permitting ATS jurisdiction for claims of 
forced labor, which is tantamount to slavery). 
41 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(deeming claims of genocide actionable under the ATS). 
11
humanity,43 tortious conversion of property,44 price-fixing,45 
environmental contamination,46 and even claims arising out of the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,47 have sought to obtain 
jurisdiction, at least in part, under the ATS. 
 The elements of an ATS claim are clear from the statutory 
 
42 See id. (considering claims of war crimes permissible under 
the ATS). 
43 See id. (allowing ATS jurisdiction for claims of crimes 
against humanity). 
44 See Cohen v. Hartman, 634 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981) (denying 
ATS jurisdiction for a claim of tortious conversion, because it 
did not meet the “law of nations” requirement of the ATS). 
45 See Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 627 
(D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing a claim of price-fixing under the ATS 
as borderline “frivolous” because of its lack of basis in 
customary international law). 
46 Flores, 343 F.3d at 161 (denying ATS jurisdiction for a claim 
of intrastate pollution as insufficiently grounded in customary 
international law). 
47 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 
539, 575-76 (D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing most of the plaintiffs’ 
tort claims on grounds other than the ATS). 
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language:48 the claim must (1) be brought by an alien and (2) 
allege a tort that (3) is a violation of the law of nations or a 
United States treaty.49 Despite this apparent simplicity, 
 
48 But see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733, n.21 (suggesting that “in an 
appropriate case” the Court would consider imposing an 
exhaustion of remedies requirement on ATS claims); Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1089-99 (9th Cir. 2006) (considering 
and ultimately refusing to graft an exhaustion of remedies 
requirement onto the ATS, given that Congress could have easily 
created such a requirement when it drafted the ATS’s sister 
statute, the Torture Victims Protection Act, in 1991); Keating-
Traynor v. Westside Crisis Ctr., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43858, at 
*20 (D. Cal. Jun. 16, 2006) (finding an alternative ground for 
dismissal of ATS claims on the basis of the tolling of the 
statute of limitations); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 
2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005) (determining that when claims under the 
ATS concern “sensitive” matters, such as genocide or torture, 
with the potential complicity of a foreign government, a “more 
searching merits-based inquiry” may be required); Kadic, 70 F.3d 
at 239 (considering and rejecting a mandatory “state action” 
requirement for ATS jurisdiction). 
49 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209, at *8 
(D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2006); Keating-Traynor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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however, ATS jurisdiction is often complex to assess.50 Most 
often, the statute’s third prong proves particularly difficult 
to apply.51 As discussed below,52 establishing jurisdiction under 
the ATS for claims of extraterritorial copyright infringement 
will likewise face the most challenging problems under this 
third statutory requirement. 
Any case brought under the ATS must pass the two tests of 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: specificity-of-definition and 
 
43858, at *18; Kevin Scott Prussia, Note and Comment, NAFTA & 
the Alien Tort Claims Act: Making a Case for Actionable Offenses 
Based on Environmental Harms and Injuries to the Public Health,
32 Am. J. L. and Med. 381, 396 (2006). 
50 See Jogi, 425 F.3d at 370 (observing at the outset of an ATS 
case that there were “a bewildering array of complex issues” to 
consider). 
51 See, e.g., Bowoto, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209, at *7-38 
(outlining the three prongs of the ATS, and then proceeding to 
consider, and reject the plaintiffs’ claims under, the third 
prong). 
52 See infra Part III.C Analysis: International, Extraterritorial 
Copyright Infringement is a Violation of the Law of Nations and 
Satisfies the ATS’s Third Prong. 
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universality-of-acceptance.53 Sosa represents the Supreme Court’s 
first-ever thorough examination of the ATS,54 complete with an 
extensive historical analysis55 and a forward-looking standard.56 
The plaintiff in Sosa, Alvarez, was abducted from his home in 
 
53 See supra note 5 (providing the two key tests of Sosa:
definitional specificity and universal acceptance in the 
international community). 
54 See Hereros v. Deutsche Afrika-Linien Gmblt & Co., 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2761, at *31 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2006) (justifying 
“keeping [the court’s] hands off” the ATS claim raised in the 
case until Sosa was decided, and noting that Sosa “finally did 
provide assistance to the federal courts in figuring out what 
the ATCA means”); see also Donovan and Roberts, supra note 23 
(recognizing Sosa as the first Supreme Court decision to 
thoroughly elucidate the ATS). 
55 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-24 (discussing the First Congress’s 
impetus in enacting the ATS, ATS’s placement in the 1789 
Judiciary Act, the question of whether the ATS was effective 
upon its enactment or whether it was “stillborn,” and the state 
of the “law of nations” in 1789 as informed by Blackstone). 
56 See supra note 5 (providing the requirements of definitional 
specificity and universal acceptance that future ATS claims must 
satisfy). 
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Mexico, allegedly pursuant to U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 
orchestration, and brought to the United States for criminal 
proceedings in which he was charged with torture and murder.57 
Alvarez responded by suing the United States and one of his 
Mexican captors (Sosa) under the ATS, alleging that he was 
falsely arrested in violation of international law.58 
In addressing Alvarez’s ATS claim, the Court faced the 
question of whether the ATS was a purely jurisdictional statute, 
or whether it was capable of creating new causes of action to 
reflect the evolution of customary international law.59 The Court 
 
57 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697-98 (recounting that Alvarez, a 
Mexican physician, was charged with prolonging the life of a 
Drug Enforcement Agency official who was tortured over a two-day 
period and then murdered). 
58 See id. 542 U.S. at 698, 734 (stating specifically that 
Alvarez argued that his false arrest constituted a violation of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and article nine of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
59 See id. 542 U.S. at 712-13 (noting that the petitioner, Sosa, 
and the United States were aligned in arguing for a purely 
jurisdictional interpretation of the ATS, while the respondent, 
Alvarez, sought to characterize the ATS as an invitation to 
courts to recognize new causes of action based upon 
16
professed to adopt neither extreme approach, and concluded that 
the ATS “was intended as jurisdictional in the sense of 
addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned 
with a certain subject.”60 As a matter of original intent, the 
Court determined that the ATS was meant to provide jurisdiction 
for three types of claims involving violations of the law of 
nations: “offenses against ambassadors, ... violations of safe 
conduct[,] ... and individual actions arising out of prize 
captures and piracy[.]”61 The common law at the time the ATS was 
enacted supplied the cause of action for such claims, and the 
 
international law). 
60 Id. 542 U.S. at 714; see also Brinton M. Wilkins, Note, 
Splitting the Baby: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Take on 
Customary International Law Under the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 2005 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1415, 1415-17 (2005) 
(expressing displeasure with the Sosa court’s decision to “split 
the proverbial baby[,]” i.e., refrain from adopting a purely 
jurisdictional or a purely cause-of-action-producing 
interpretation of the ATS, and recommending the former).  
61 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720; see also William Blackstone, 4
Commentaries *68 (commenting that the three “principal” offences 
against the law of nations were violations of safe-conducts, 
infringements of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy). 
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ATS provided the district courts with jurisdiction to hear 
them.62 While the Court held that the drafters of the ATS only 
meant to provide jurisdiction for these three types of claims,63 
it did not prohibit the ATS from serving as a jurisdictional 
basis for new causes of action based upon customary 
international law.64 Rather, the Court held that new claims may 
 
62 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720; see also David D. Caron and Brad R. 
Roth, International Decision: Scope of Alien Tort Statute -
arbitrary arrest and detention as violations of custom, 98
A.J.I.L. 798, 801 (2004) (mentioning that, when a court, post-
Sosa, creates a new cause of action under the ATS, it does so by 
relying upon the federal common law).  
63 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (concluding that there is no reason 
to believe that the First Congress contemplated any claims 
invoking ATS jurisdiction other than Blackstone’s three 
archetypical principles of normative international law). 
64 See id., 542 U.S. at 745 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing 
that the First Congress did indeed endorse Blackstone’s three 
exemplars of customary international law, but that modern courts 
lack authority to fashion new causes of action under the ATS. 
Justice Scalia also pointed out that, by relying on the federal 
common law to provide the cause of action for new claims under 
customary international law, courts may render the ATS 
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secure ATS jurisdiction as long as they “rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 
18th-century paradigms” described above.65 The Court’s standard 
is quite cautious, but leaves the door open to claims that have 
as much “definite content and acceptance among civilized 
nations” as the three types of claims originally cognizable 
under the ATS.66 
superfluous. That is, if federal courts are able to incorporate 
customary international law into the federal common law, which 
is “supreme federal law,” ordinary federal question jurisdiction 
could provide jurisdiction for such claims as well as the ATS). 
65 Id., 542 U.S. at 725; see also Igor Fuks, Note, Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain and the Future of ATCA Litigation: Examining 
Bonded Labor Claims and Corporate Liability, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 
112, 122 (2006) (recognizing that Sosa’s specificity and 
acceptance requirements are “rather vague standards” and may 
pose difficulties to lower courts in their application). 
66 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729-732 (reiterating the specificity and 
acceptance requirements of the ATS, and offering the 
metaphorical summation that “the door [to the ATS] is still ajar 
subject to vigilant doorkeeping”). 
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B.  Post-Sosa ATS Litigation with Relevance to a Claim of  
Extraterritorial, International Copyright Infringement 
 
Determining whether a novel ATS claim passes the twin tests 
of Sosa requires an assessment of cases that have construed and 
applied Sosa. One particularly pertinent case is Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, PLC.67 In Sarei several plaintiffs from Papua New Guinea 
brought an ATS action against two corporations for claims of 
(among other things) violations of two provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea68 (“UNCLOS”).69 Under the 
UNCLOS, states must take measures necessary to “prevent, reduce 
and control pollution of the marine environment,”70 including 
 
67 See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D. Cal. 2002) (providing the 
factual background of the case, as written by the district 
court). 
68 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 (Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS] (providing the 
complete text of the UNCLOS). 
69 Id. 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.  
70 See UNCLOS, infra note 186, art. 194(1) (incorporating the 
definition of “pollution of the marine environment” from Part I, 
art. 1(1)(4) of the UNCLOS, to include the introduction of 
“substances or energy” into the marine environment, causing 
“hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, 
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land-based pollution.”71 The trial court held, and the Ninth 
Circuit agreed,72 that, because the UNCLOS was ratified by 166 
nations, it represented the law of nations.73 Consequently, the 
plaintiffs’ environmental claims based on the UNCLOS were 
permissible under the ATS.74 
A second important case that construed Sosa is Jogi v. 
Voges.75 In Jogi, much like Sarei, a treaty directed toward state 
action (rather than private action) was deemed to satisfy Sosa’s 
 
including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, 
impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of 
amenities[.]” 
71 See UNCLOS, supra note 68, art. 207(1). 
72 Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078. 
73 See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (stating that, while the 
United States has not yet ratified the UNCLOS, it has signed it, 
and that the UNCLOS’s level of international acceptance 
qualifies it a principle of customary international law). 
74 See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62 (providing the district 
court’s disposition of the case, under which the plaintiffs’ ATS 
claim was approved); Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 (providing the 
Ninth Circuit’s substantial affirmance of the trial court’s 
opinion). 
75 Jogi, 425 F.3d 367. 
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tests.76 The plaintiff’s claim in Jogi was that he was not told 
of his rights, as an arrestee, under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (“Vienna Convention”)77 to contact the Indian 
consulate.78 The court held that, while the Vienna Convention 
generally deals with inter-state relations, Article 36 provides 
detained nationals with a private right to consular assistance.79 
The court’s decision relied primarily on certain language of 
Article 36 that seemed to imply private rights, and thus a 
private cause of action.80 
C.  Multilateral Copyright Instruments that Establish  
Copyright Infringement as a Violation of the Law of  
Nations 
 
The community of nations has sought to reduce copyright 
 
76 See id. at 382 (holding that while “most parts of the Vienna 
Convention address only state-to-state matters, Article 36 
confers individual rights on detained nationals”). 
77 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 
(April 24, 1963) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
78 Id. 425 F.3d at 369-70. 
79 Id. 425 F.3d at 382. 
80 See id. at 374 (emphasizing that, under Article 36, consular 
authorities must receive notification of a detained national’s 
detention “if he so requests[,]” and that the arresting state 
shall promptly “inform the person concerned” of his rights). 
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infringement through multilateral agreements for over 100 
years.81 In addition to the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement, 
numerous other multilateral agreements currently address 
international copyright law, including the Universal Copyright 
Convention,82 the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”) Copyright Treaty,83 the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty,84 the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers 
of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of their 
Phonograms,85 and the International Convention for the Protection 
 
81 See Berne, supra note 6 (providing the text of the Berne 
Convention, which was adopted by eight nations on December 5, 
1887, and completed in Paris on May 4, 1896). 
82 Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 
revised July 24, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 1341, [hereinafter UCC]. 
83 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, 
Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 28542 (adopted by the WIPO 
Diplomatic Conference) [hereinafter WCT]. 
84 World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, December 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 
36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT]. 
85 The Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of 
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms, 
Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. 
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of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organizations.86 Additionally, various recommendations and 
declarations of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) manifest an international 
consensus on the necessity of protecting the rights of authors 
and artists.87 While these multinational instruments signify the 
international community’s significant and long-standing 
commitment to the principle of international copyright 
 
86 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 
1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
87 See, e.g., Recommendation Concerning the Status of the Artist, 
UNESCO, 21st Sess., (Oct. 27, 1980) available at http://portal.u 
nesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13138&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201 
.html (establishing that, because artists have a “right to enjoy 
the fruits of their work[,]” members states have a duty to 
protect the works of artists); Charter on the Preservation of 
Digital Heritage, UNESCO, 32nd Sess., (Oct. 15, 2003) available
at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=17721&URL_DO=DO_TOP 
IC&URL_SECTION=2 01.html (calling for a balance struck between 
the “legitimate rights of creators” of digital materials and the 
general public “in accordance with international norms and 
agreements”). 
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protection, this Comment relies on the Berne Convention and the 
TRIPS Agreement to provide the substantive aspects of that 
principle.88 
1. The Berne Convention 
The Berne Convention was adopted on September 9, 1886 in 
Berne, Switzerland.89 By the turn of the century, only 12 
countries had become signatories to Berne,90 yet today Berne is 
in force in 162 nations.91 The Berne Convention, one century 
 
88 Cf. William Party, Choice of Law and International Copyright,
48 Am. J. Comp. L. 383, 419 (2000) (arguing that, if copyright 
protection was incorporated into customary international law, it 
would most likely occur via the Berne Convention; however, for 
purposes of Berne evading its non-self-executory status and 
having “direct” applicability in the United States, such an 
approach is “too clever”). 
89 See Berne, supra note 6. 
90 See Contracting Parties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/Show 
Results.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=1884&end_year=1900&search_
what=C&treaty_id=15 (last visited Sept. 20, 2006) (providing a 
list of the signatory states of Berne in 1900). 
91 See Contracting Parties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowR 
esults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=ANY&end_year=ANY&search_wha
t=C&treaty_id=15 (last visited Oct. 18, 2006) (providing a 
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after its origination, finally92 entered into force in the United 
States on March 1, 1989.93 In the Berne Convention Implementation 
Act of 1988, Congress declared that the Berne Convention was 
non-self-executory, that the United States would perform its 
obligations thereunder “only pursuant to appropriate domestic 
law[,]” and that the United States’s existing copyright laws 
fully satisfied its obligations under the Berne Convention.94 
complete list of all current signatory states to Berne). 
92 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National 
Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 469, 477 
(2000) (suggesting that the United States “belatedly” acceded to 
the Berne Convention, and that subsequently, international 
pressures have helped to shape American copyright law). 
93 See Berne, supra note 6 (referencing the Paris text of the 
Berne Convention, which is the most current text of the 
Convention). 
94 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
568, § 2 102 Stat. 2853 (1988); see also 17 U.S.C. § 104(c) 
(2006) (denying claims based upon any “work eligible for 
protection under” the federal copyright statute arising “by 
virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne 
Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto”); 
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995) 
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Two of the most salient characteristics of the Berne 
Convention are its establishment of a “Union” of signatories who 
pledge themselves to adhere to certain minimum standards of 
copyright protection, and its guarantee of equal national 
treatment – i.e., that signatory A will protect the works of 
nationals from signatory B to the extent A protects the works of 
its own nationals. 95 A third hallmark of the Berne Convention is 
perhaps its aversion toward “formalities” that may complicate 
obtaining a copyright.96 
(observing that, by passing the Berne Convention Implementation 
Act and declaring the complete supersession of U.S. copyright 
law over Berne’s provisions, Congress “side-stepped” the tricky 
issue of protecting moral rights, as required by Berne). 
95 See Dinwoodie, supra note 92, at 491 (describing Berne’s 
minimum substantive standards and endorsement of the national 
treatment principle as the Convention’s overarching 
characteristics). 
96 See Berne, supra note 6, art. 5(2) (providing that the rights 
flowing from Berne “shall not be subject to any formality”); 
John R. Kettle III, Dancing to the Beat of a Different Drummer: 
Global Harmonization - And the Need for Congress to Get in Step 
with a Full Public Performance Right for Sound Recordings, 12
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1041, 1076-77 (2002) 
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2. The TRIPS Agreement  
 The TRIPS Agreement is one of several multilateral 
agreements97 that were created during the formation of the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”).98 Consonant with the WTO’s ambitious 
scope, the TRIPS Agreement protects not only copyrights, but 
also a broad range of other intellectual property rights.99 The 
 
(describing how the United States had to eliminate its copyright 
notice and registration formalities in order to join Berne). 
97 See WTO | legal texts - the WTO agreements, http://www.wto.org 
/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) 
(providing information about the other agreements in the WTO 
bundle, which concern the trade of goods, services, civil 
aircrafts, bovine meat, and dairy products, as well as dispute 
settlement within the WTO context, trade policy review, and 
governmental procurement).  
98 See generally The WTO in Brief, http://www.wto.org/english/the 
wto_e/what is_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 
2006) (describing the Uruguay Round negotiations as multilateral 
talks aimed at reducing international trade barriers). 
99 See WTO | intellectual property - overview of TRIPS Agreement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm, (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2006) (outlining the various fields of 
intellectual property covered by the TRIPS Agreement, which 
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TRIPS Agreement initially had 111 signatories,100 a number that 
has since risen to 149.101 
Even before the TRIPS Agreement was set to take effect,102 
Congress passed legislation implementing the WTO Agreements and 
limiting their domestic enforceability.103 Specifically, Congress 
 
include copyright and related rights, trademarks and service 
marks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, 
and trade secrets and test data). 
100 See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 4-18 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 18.06 (2003) [hereinafter Nimmer] (noting that the 
Final Act of the Uruguay Round Negotiations was signed on April 
15, 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco by the United States and 110 
other nations). 
101 See WTO | Understanding the WTO – members, 
http://www.wto.org/ english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2006) (providing a complete list of the 
WTO’s 149 member nations and their respective dates of 
accession). 
102 See generally Nimmer, supra note 100, 1.12[D] (observing that 
the Senate never actually ratified the Uruguay Round Agreements 
as a formal treaty). 
103 See 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (2006) (providing that “[n]o person 
other than the United States … shall have any cause of action or 
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declared that federal law would trump any TRIPS provision in the 
event of conflict,104 and that the United States – as opposed to 
any private plaintiff - would have the exclusive right to bring 
a suit under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, including 
TRIPS.105 Courts have construed these statutory principles as 
rendering the TRIPS Agreement non-self-executing, and barring 
private claims brought thereunder.106 
D.  The Scope and Characteristics of International  
Copyright Infringement 
 
Diversification of copyrightable material over the years107 
defense under” the Uruguay Round Agreements). 
104 See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (declaring the supersession of 
U.S. law over any provision of the Uruguay Round Agreements in 
the event of conflict). 
105 See supra note 103 (providing that private individuals shall 
have no cause of action under the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
106 See, e.g., In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(regarding TRIPS as non-self-executory in light of Congress’s 
requirements that U.S. law trump TRIPS provisions in the event 
of conflict, and that only the United States, rather than any 
private party, has a right of action under TRIPS). 
107 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (providing that copyrights 
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has led to an increase in the means of copyright infringement.108 
In 1790, when the First Congress drafted the first copyright 
statute for the United States, the only works accorded 
protection were maps, charts, and books.109 Modern copyright law 
also provides protection for musical works; dramatic works; 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; pantomimes and 
choreographic works; motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works; sound recordings; and architectural works.110 
may apply to “works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium 
of expression,” including literary works; musical works; 
dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural works) 
with infra note 109 (providing copyright protection for only 
maps, charts, and books).  
108 Cf. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1984) (describing Congress’ expansion of 
federal copyright law as a response to “new technology”). 
109 See Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Cong. Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 
(granting U.S. citizens and residents copyrights over maps, 
charts, and books). 
110 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (providing copyright protection for 
various types of original works of authorship that have been 
31
The enforcement of intellectual property rights, including 
copyrights, is vital to creativity and economic growth in the 
United States.111 According to the Motion Picture Association, 
movie companies lose an annual $6.1 billion due to worldwide 
copyright infringement, with $1.2 billion coming from the Asia-
Pacific region.112 The Recording Industry Association of America 
estimates that the American music industry loses $4.2 billion 
annually to global copyright infringement.113 Similarly, American 
publishers of written materials lost approximately $500 million 
 
“fixed in any tangible medium of expression”). 
111 See generally 2006 Report, supra note 29 (describing the 
harmful effects of global piracy for “creative economies”); 2004 
Strategy, supra note 28 (characterizing global piracy as a 
threat to “America’s innovation economy”). 
112 See Motion Picture Association, Anti-Piracy Fact Sheet: Asia-
Pacific Region (2006) (providing an overview of motion picture 
piracy in the Asia-Pacific region, and summarizing the economic 
impact it has on member organizations). 
113 See Recording Industry Association of America: Anti-Piracy, 
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (last visited Dec. 
15, 2006) (comparing copyright infringement to traditional, 
ocean-based piracy, and summarizing its effects on the recording 
industry). 
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from world copyright infringement last year, according to the 
Association of American Publishers.114 
In terms of the U.S. economy as a whole, “copyright 
industries” contributed between $626.2 billion and $1.254 
trillion to the national economy in 2002, depending on how such 
industries are defined.115 As a percentage of gross domestic 
product, that translates into six to twelve percent of the total 
U.S. economy for the same year.116 The copyright industry employs 
between 5.48 and 11.5 million people in the United States, and 
has experienced employment growth rates above those pertaining 
to the total U.S. workforce.117 To the extent copyright 
 
114 See Association of American Publishers: Anti-Piracy Program, 
http://www.publishers.org/antipiracy/index.cfm (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2006) (describing infringement of copyrights for books 
and journals as “rampant” and estimating the effect it has on 
American publishers). 
115 See Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U.S. 
Economy: The 2004 Report (2004) (assessing the economic 
footprint of copyright related commerce in the United States in 
terms of “core” copyright industries and “total” copyright 
industries).  
116 Id.
117 Id.
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protection is designed to encourage the production of creative 
works by an economic incentive,118 therefore, reducing that 
incentive may limit the creative and economic potential of 
America.    
 
III. ANALYSIS   
 The ATS may provide subject matter jurisdiction for claims 
of international, extraterritorial copyright infringement. In 
any ATS claim, the plaintiff must be an alien who alleges a tort 
that amounts to a violation of a United States treaty or the law 
of nations.119 According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa,
118 See Furine Blaise, Comment, Game Over: Issues Arising When 
Copyrighted Work is Licensed to Video Game Manufacturers, 15 
Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 517, 523-24 (2005) (noting that, “from 
the beginning,” copyright law was meant to promote creative 
production through an economic inventive). But see Russell J. 
Anderson, Jr., Return of the Guilds: A Reflection on the 
Domestic and International Implications of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
12 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L.J. 49, 49-50 (2003) (suggesting that 
the focus of copyright policy has changed from the encouragement 
of creative endeavors, to enriching the distributors of 
copyrighted goods). 
119 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
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ATS claims must also be specifically defined and enjoy 
international acceptance.120 A claim of international, 
extraterritorial copyright infringement may satisfy the 
standards of the ATS, as interpreted in Sosa, and therefore 
successfully secure ATS jurisdiction.  
A.  The ATS’s Requirement that the Plaintiff be an Alien  
May be Met  
 
The first element of the ATS requires that an “alien” be 
the individual or entity bringing the suit.121 In the context of 
copyright infringement, this means that the copyright-holder 
claiming infringement must be an alien.122 Not surprisingly, this 
rather straightforward element has been a minor obstacle in ATS 
litigation compared to the second, and especially the third, 
elements of the ATS.123 Essentially, an “alien” is a non-
 
120 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
121 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing subject matter jurisdiction 
for “any civil action by an alien”) (emphasis added). 
122 See Keating-Traynor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43858, at *18 
(dismissing plaintiffs’ ATS claims because they were not 
aliens). 
123 See, e.g., id. at *18-19 (assessing plaintiffs’ status as 
“aliens” in conclusory fashion); Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 
2d at 24 (noting that the plaintiffs were “plainly aliens,” and 
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citizen.124 A plaintiff with dual-citizenship (in the United 
States and another country) is a United States citizen, and thus 
not an alien.125 The ATS does not require that defendants be 
aliens in order for jurisdiction to vest.126 
then progressing to consider “whether plaintiffs have adequately 
pled that defendants violated the law of nations”); Arndt v. UBS 
AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (D.N.Y. 2004) (deciding that, 
because the plaintiffs were German citizens, they were aliens 
within the meaning of the ATS). 
124 Keating-Traynor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43858, at *18. See 
also Blacks Law Dictionary 79 (deluxe 8th ed. 2004) (defining an 
“alien” as a person born outside of U.S. jurisdiction, who is 
“subject to some foreign government, and who has not been 
naturalized under U.S. law”); William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries 
*354 (distinguishing between natural-born subjects and aliens on 
the ground that natural-born subjects are “born within the 
dominions of the crown of England,” while aliens “are born out 
of it”). 
125 See Keating-Traynor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43858, at *18 
(barring the ATS claims of two plaintiffs on the ground that 
their dual citizenship – in the United States and another 
country – rendered them non-aliens). 
126 See Miner v. Begum, 8 F. Supp. 2d 643, 644 (D. Tex. 1998) 
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Various factual scenarios could give rise to an ATS claim 
of international, extraterritorial copyright infringement. 
Importantly, however, the ATS could not provide jurisdiction for 
claims of infringement occurring in the United States. Aliens 
are already entitled to copyright protection under federal 
law,127 and therefore resort to the ATS as an enforcement vehicle 
would be unnecessary as well as improper.128 Use of the ATS is 
 
(stating that, for ATS purposes, the citizenship of defendants 
is “irrelevant”). Other issues may arise that could undermine 
the plaintiff’s ability to advance a successful ATS claim 
against a defendant, however, such as sovereign immunity. See, 
e.g., Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that sovereign immunity did not attach to an individual 
member of a governing committee); Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *109-10 (D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) 
(recognizing that the United States may claim sovereign immunity 
as a defense to an ATS claim if it has not already waived such 
privilege). 
127 See 17 U.S.C. § 104(a), (b) (providing protection for 
unpublished works “without regard to the nationality or domicile 
of the author[,]” and for published works of alien authorship in 
certain circumstances). 
128 Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (inviting Congress to “occupy the 
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desirable, however, where federal copyright law leaves off: 
extraterritorial infringement. United States copyright law does 
not have “extraterritorial operation.”129 In other words, acts of 
infringement that occur outside the jurisdiction of the United 
 
field” of customary international law that otherwise might 
provide the basis for an ATS claim); The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that customary international law 
is “part of our law” where there is “no controlling executive or 
legislative act or juricial [sic] decision”); Enahoro, 408 F.3d 
at 884-85 (barring a plaintiff from asserting a claim under 
customary international law where a federal statute occupies the 
field). 
129 Palmer v. Braun, 376 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004); 
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 
1095-06 (9th Cir. 1994); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Pub., Ltd.,
843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988); Nimmer, supra note 100, 17.02; 
see also Curtis A. Bradley, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. 
Intellectual Property Law: Principal Paper: Territorial 
Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 Va. J. 
Int'l L. 505, 507-08 (1997) (describing the uncertain rationale 
behind treating federal trademark law as having extraterritorial 
application, but denying such extraterritoriality to federal 
copyright and patent law). 
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States are not remediable in federal courts. 
 Thus the ATS, rather than federal copyright law, may 
provide a cause of action where an alien’s copyrights are 
infringed overseas. For example, if a British record company 
held copyrights to music that was infringed via a Chinese 
website,130 the record company may bring an ATS action against 
the website. Because the infringing conduct would have occurred 
outside the United States, the ATS may prove an attractive 
enforcement tool in light of the ineffectiveness of federal 
law.131 As another example, if a manufacturing plant in Russia 
pirated optical discs,132 an alien with copyrights to material on 
such discs may bring an ATS action against the plant. Again, 
federal law would not help such a plaintiff because of the 
 
130 Cf. China targets net pirates, BBC News, Apr. 2, 2000, 
http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/698659.stm (describing 
a Chinese court’s decision to hold a website that offered 
pirated music for download liable for damages to Chinese and 
American record companies). 
131 See supra note 129 (noting that federal copyright law is 
territorial in its application). 
132 See 2006 Report, supra note 29 (reviewing Russia’s progress 
in enforcing intellectual property rights, yet noting that 
plants are still used to pirate copyrighted works). 
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extraterritoriality of the infringement,133 and the ATS would 
represent a promising alternative.  
 It may be argued, however, that any international norm of 
copyright protection must itself be strictly territorial in 
nature, and thus could not provide the basis for an ATS action 
in a U.S. court. That is, copyright protections under the Berne 
Convention134 and TRIPS Agreement135 apply only territorially, and 
 
133 See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.,
24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994) (determining that, whereas 
purely extraterritorial acts of copyright infringement are not 
actionable under U.S. copyright law, such acts are not made 
actionable in the event they receive domestic authorization). 
134 See Kathleen Patchel, Choice of Law and Software Licenses: A 
Framework for Discussion, 26 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 117, 148
(2000) (noting that Berne’s protection of intellectual property 
rights, as reflected in the principle of “national treatment,” 
is territorially limited); Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and 
Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright 
Infringement Litigation, 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1, 25 
(describing the Berne Convention as resting on assumptions of 
territorial limitation).   
135 See Matthew Kramer, Comment, The Bolar Amendment Abroad: 
Preserving the Integrity of American Patents Overseas After the 
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therefore any principle of customary international law derived 
from those treaties must also be territorial in application. 
However, even if the normative principle of copyright protection 
to be drawn from Berne and TRIPS is strictly territorial, an 
alien may still use the ATS to enforce that norm in U.S. court. 
The reason why is the recognized extraterritorial operability of 
the ATS.136 Because the ATS concerns only the tort claims of 
aliens, the alleged tortious conduct often occurs outside of the 
United States.137 Indeed, (sea-based) piracy, a quintessential 
ATS claim according to the Sosa court, occurs on the open seas 
rather than on U.S. territory.138 Thus, if the principle of 
 
South African Medicines Act, 18 Dick. J. Int'l L. 553, 572 
(2000) (describing the TRIPS framework as “hyper-territorial” in 
character). 
136 See Donovan and Roberts, supra note 23, 146 (recognizing that 
the ATS is an extraterritorial statute, and permits so-called 
“universal jurisdiction”). 
137 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 
2003) (concerning an ATS action brought by citizens of Papua New 
Guinea who alleged various violations of international law 
occurring in Papua New Guinea). 
138 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820) (defining 
piracy as robbery “upon the sea”). 
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customary international law derived from Berne and TRIPS is 
territorial, countries with extraterritorial statutes similar to 
the ATS may be able to serve as a forum for litigation. As it 
turns out, the ATS is unique to the United States,139 and 
therefore claims of international, extraterritorial copyright 
infringement may be brought in U.S. courts and perhaps no where 
else. 
B.   International, Extraterritorial Copyright Infringement  
is a Tort and Satisfies the ATS’s Second Prong 
 
To assess whether extraterritorial copyright infringement 
is a tort and thus satisfies the second element of the ATS, the 
applicable substantive law in ATS litigation must be 
determined.140 That is, does the law of the jurisdiction in which 
the infringement took place govern,141 or does federal statutory 
 
139 See Donovan and Roberts, supra note 23, 149 (remarking that 
no nation has an extraterritorial statute similar to the ATS). 
140 See generally, Party, supra note 88, at 417 (observing that, 
because customary international law is universally adhered to, 
and exists apart from domestic law, there are no conflicts of 
law issues in terms of its substance). 
141 Cf. Paul E. Geller, International Copyright: An Introduction, 
in 1 International Copyright Law and Practice, § 3[1][a][i] 
(Geller ed., 2006) [hereinafter International Copyright Law and 
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law, federal common law,142 state statutory law, or state common 
law apply?143 Or, alternatively, does the law of nations itself 
provide the cause of action? 
 The Supreme Court addressed this question in Sosa. It held 
that the ATS was originally meant to provide the district courts 
with subject matter jurisdiction, while the common law would 
provide the cause of action for tort claims.144 Specifically, the 
 
Practice] (deducing that, pursuant to the principle of “national 
treatment” under Berne, courts will apply the copyright law of 
the nation in which the infringement occurred (implicitly 
assuming the suit was brought in that nation)).  
142 See generally Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661-62 (1834) 
(determining that there is no common law copyright, and thus the 
federal copyright statute must determine issues of copyright 
infringement). 
143 See generally id. (favoring the federal copyright statute to 
a state or federal common law of copyright); Jogi, 425 F.3d at 
373 (expressing relief that the plaintiff’s claim arose under a 
treaty, rather than customary international law, because the 
latter is difficult to characterize as either federal common law 
or state common law). 
144 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (outlining the original 
understanding of the ATS, under which the common law was to 
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federal common law was to supply the substantive legal basis145 
for claims under the ATS.146 
Following Sosa, courts have often avoided discussing the 
application of federal common law, and have summarily treated 
causes of action as either torts or non-torts.147 Although one 
could argue that, if the law of nations is an integral component 
 
provide the cause of action for ATS claims). 
145 See generally International Copyright Law and Practice, supra
note 141, at 3[1][a][i] (expressing the view that, if an alien 
brought a claim directly under a treaty, such as the Berne 
Convention or the TRIPS Agreement, rather than under customary 
international law, the law of the nation in which the 
infringement occurred would provide the substantive standard and 
not the federal common law. 
146 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. See also Sarei, 456 F.3d 1069 
(applying the doctrine of vicarious liability in an ATS action 
as a matter of federal common law). 
147 See, e.g., Abdullahi, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126, at *19  
(classifying without discussion plaintiffs’ claims of injections 
of an experimental antibiotic as torts); Arndt, 342 F. Supp. 2d 
at 138 (deciding without analysis that “conversion” is a tort 
under the ATS). 
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of the federal common law,148 the international community must, 
therefore, recognize particular conduct as tortious in order to 
satisfy the ATS’s second element,149 courts have simply not 
addressed this issue.150 Nevertheless, it appears nearly certain 
that courts determine whether particular conduct is tortious by 
 
148 See Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 200 (D. Mass. 2004) 
(stating that normative international law is binding in U.S. 
courts as a component of the federal common law); Leading Case: 
B. Alien Tort Statute, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 446, 453 (2004) 
[hereinafter Harvard Leading Case] (regarding Sosa as consistent 
with the post-Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins view that customary 
international law is included in the federal common law). 
149 See generally International Copyright Law and Practice, supra
note 141, at 1-FRA § 8[3][a] (describing the infringement of 
economic copyrights in France as a tort under the civil law); 
International Copyright Law and Practice, supra note 141, at 2-
NETH § 8[1][c][iii][A] (noting that the plaintiffs advanced tort 
claims of contributory infringement under Dutch law against 
defendants who sold devices meant to circumvent the protections 
on copyrighted software).  
150 See infra note 145 (discussing cases in which conduct has 
been deemed tortious or non-tortious without to some form of 
international consensus on such a classification). 
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reference to traditional principles of American tort law, rather 
than to some form of international consensus on the issue. After 
all, if courts were applying foreign law to assess the tortious 
quality of infringing actions, they would likely acknowledge 
their doing so.151 
In terms of copyright infringement, there is no precedent 
under the federal common law or any other body of law holding 
that international, extraterritorial copyright infringement is a 
tort. This is not surprising because courts have never addressed 
this issue. Unless and until an alien plaintiff advances such a 
claim, the federal common law will not have a chance to 
incorporate or reject it. Nevertheless, international, 
extraterritorial copyright infringement should constitute a tort 
 
151 Cf. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (determining 
without international reference that the plaintiffs’ claims - of 
genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, arbitrary detention, 
extrajudicial killing – “plainly” satisfied the ATS’s second 
element); Arndt, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (regarding the 
plaintiff’s claims, including “conversion,” as torts, without 
any reference to non-American law); Trans-Continental Inv. Corp. 
S. A. v. Bank of Commonwealth, 500 F. Supp. 565, 570 (D. Cal. 
1980) (conceding that “fraud is a universally recognized tort” 
without reference to international standards).  
46
under the federal common law. 
 First, under state common law, copyright infringement has 
traditionally been deemed a tort.152 Although the law of state 
common law copyrights has been preempted in part by the 
Copyright Act of 1976,153 it remains partially applicable today154 
152 De Gette v. Mine Co. Restaurant, Inc., 751 F.2d 1143, 1145 
(10th Cir. 1985); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 186 (2d 
Cir. 1981); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Marine 
Co., 543 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir. 1976); Fenton McHugh 
Productions, Inc. v. WGN Continental Productions Co., 105 Ill. 
App. 3d 481 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142, 
143 (D.N.Y. 1918). 
153 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (providing that federal copyright 
preemption occurs with respect to state rights that are (1) 
equivalent to federal rights granted under 17 U.S.C. § 106, and 
(2) that overlap with copyrightable subject matter as provided 
by 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, so long as the work at issue is “fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression”); see also Nimmer, supra
note 100, 1.01[B] (restating the two requirements for federal 
preemption, and suggesting that Congress fell short of its goal 
of eliminating any “vague borderline areas between State and 
Federal” copyright provisions).   
154 Cf. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 4 N.Y.3d 
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and provides a doctrinal basis from which the federal common law 
may draw in characterizing extraterritorial infringement. 
Moreover, copyright infringement is considered a tort under the 
modern federal copyright statute.155 Thus, if particular 
infringing actions constitute a tort under state common law and 
federal statutory law, it would seem incongruous for the federal 
common law to treat them otherwise. That is, if the only 
difference between a claim of extraterritorial infringement and 
a claim of infringement occurring in the United States is 
territoriality, it would seem illogical to classify the same 
 
540, 559-60 (2005) (holding that sound recordings fixed before 
February 15, 1972, are entitled to copyright protection under 
New York’s common law until 15, 2067, the date of federal 
statutory preemption). 
155 Salton, Inc. v. Philips Domestic Appliances & Pers. Care 
B.V., 391 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 2004), citing Bassett v. 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 360 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Costello Pub. Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); see also Nimmer, supra note 100, 14.04[E][2][d] 
(characterizing the owner of two television stations that 
committed copyright infringement by airing a television program 
as a joint tortfeasor with respect to each station). 
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underlying infringing actions differently.156 
It may be argued, however, that the federal common law 
cannot be the doctrinal basis for a claim of international, 
extraterritorial copyright infringement, because copyright 
protection is grounded in statute rather than the common law.157 
If a common law of copyright were recognized, therefore, the 
1976 Copyright Act would be effectively evaded.158 The problem 
with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between 
 
156 Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing United States v. Smith,
where the court approved of Congress borrowing the definition of 
piracy from the law of nations, as a case that contained a 
sufficiently well-defined claim of customary international law).  
157 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661-62 (1834) (finding 
that there was no basis in the federal, or Pennsylvania, common 
law, for copyright protection of published works); see also,
Intellectual Property Stories 66 [hereinafter IP Stories] (Jane 
C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (noting that, 
under Wheaton, copyright protection is purely statutory after an 
author has first published his works). 
158 Cf. Nimmer, supra note 100, 1.01[A] (noting that, between 
Wheaton in 1834 and passage of the Copyright Act in 1976, state 
common law governed copyrights of unpublished works, and federal 
statutory law governed copyright of published works). 
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causes of action that arise within the domestic common law, and 
causes of action that arise as customary international law and 
are imported into domestic common law.159 Surely, the Copyright 
Act has displaced most of the state common law of copyright, 
however, the same cannot be said for the international norm of 
copyright protection. First, such a norm would be federal rather 
than state in nature, and thus would not face the same 
preemption problems faced by state common law under the 1976 
Copyright Act.160 Second, federal copyright law is strictly 
territorial, and thus does not apply to acts of infringement 
occurring outside of the United States.161 Therefore, because the 
rights protected by federal copyright law are not equivalent to 
 
159 Cf. Sosa, 542. U.S. at 732 (describing the standard by which 
novel claims of customary international law may be evaluated in 
order to become part of the federal common law). 
160 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(recognizing that “a judicially created federal rule based on 
international norms would be supreme federal law,” and could 
trump inconsistent state law); see also U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 
2 (providing that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land). 
161 See supra note 129 (describing the strictly territorial 
nature of the Copyright Act). 
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those protected by normative international law, the latter may 
escape federal preemption.162 Third, to the extent the above 
argument focuses directly on the federal common law, and posits 
that Wheaton v. Peters expressly denied a federal common law of 
copyright, it rests on a weak foundation. The Wheaton court not 
only declined to apply a federal common law of copyright; it 
denied the existence of the federal common law.163 Thus, given 
that ATS claims that invoke the law of nations necessarily rest 
upon the federal common law,164 Wheaton cannot convincingly 
foreclose a federal common law of copyright.165 Not surprisingly, 
Wheaton’s wholesale denial of the federal common law did not go 
further to suggest that, if there were a federal common law, 
 
162 Cf. Nimmer, supra note 100, 1.01[B][1] (noting that copyright 
laws are not preempted by the Copyright Act if they require 
“qualitatively” different elements to state a cause of action). 
163 See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 658 (finding it “clear” that there is 
no federal common law, and that the only sources of federal law 
are the Constitution and federal statutes). 
164 See supra note 144 (providing that the federal common is to 
supply the substantive legal basis of ATS actions). 
165 See IP Stories, supra note 157, 67 (noting that Justice 
McLean, writing for the majority in Wheaton, provided an 
assessment of federal common law that “is, at best, suspect”).  
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copyright protections would not be a part of it. Finally, as the 
law of (sea-based) piracy demonstrates, the federal common law 
and a federal statute may coexist even if they prohibit 
identical conduct.166 In the case of international norms of 
copyright protection, therefore, the fact that U.S. law also 
protects copyrights should not bar the federal common law from 
incorporating similar protections. 
C. International, Extraterritorial Copyright Infringement  
is a Violation of The Law of Nations and Satisfies the 
ATS’s Third Prong 
 
Customary international law protects the copyrights of 
aliens against extraterritorial infringement.167 Specifically, 
 
166 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (outlawing “the crime of 
piracy as defined by the law of nations”) with Sosa, 542 U.S. at
724 (recognizing piracy, under the law of nations, as a valid 
component of the federal common law for purposes of bringing an 
ATS action). 
167 See International Copyright Law and Practice, supra note 141, 
at § [2][a] (providing the basis for a different approach toward 
an infringement action under the ATS. In a country in which 
treaties are self-executing, such as Germany, copyright 
infringement occurring in Germany could be considered to violate 
the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement. If so, the plaintiff 
could possibly bring an ATS action in the United States and 
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through widespread adherence to multilateral treaties such as 
the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, the community of 
nations has recognized168 and enforced169 a custom170 that protects 
the copyrights of aliens. 
In order for a legal principle to become customary 
international law, three elements must generally be established: 
the principle must (1) be of mutual, rather than several, 
concern to the community of nations, and (2) be universally 
abided by (3) out of a sense of legal obligation.171 
bypass the difficulties of articulating normative international 
law by asserting a treaty violation instead); see also Jogi, 425
F.3d at 373 (observing that, because the plaintiff’s claim arose 
under the Vienna Convention rather than customary international 
law, a “knotty question” was be avoided). 
168 See infra section II(C)(2). 
169 See infra section II(C)(3). 
170 Cf. J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of 
Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS Component of 
the WTO Agreement, 29 Int'l Law. 345, 347 (1995) (describing the 
TRIPS Agreement as reflecting “time-tested, basic norms of 
international intellectual property law” as found in the Berne 
Convention and other multilateral agreements) (emphasis added). 
171 Flores, 414 F.3d at 248-49; Abdullahi, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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Additionally, as noted above, Sosa requires any claim of 
customary international law under the ATS to have sufficient 
international acceptance and specificity. 172 Thus, if the 
general standard for customary international law is combined 
with Sosa’s requirements, the result is four-part test. 
Ultimately, ATS claims relying on the law of nations must: (1) 
be of mutual international concern, (2) be universally abided by 
(3) out of a sense of legal obligation, and (4) contain the 
level of specificity required by Sosa. These four requirements 
are addressed below. 
1.  Multilateral Copyright Instruments Satisfy the  
Requirement of Mutual International Concern 
 
International copyright infringement is undoubtedly an 
issue of mutual, rather than several, concern to the community 
of nations. The very existence of a “Union for the protection of 
the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works[,]”173 
as constituted by the Berne Convention’s 162 member nations, 
 
16126, at *27-28; see also infra note 8 (describing the way in 
which the practice of states may evolve into normative 
international law). 
172 See supra note 5 (providing the definitional specificity and 
universal acceptance requirements of Sosa). 
173 See Berne, supra note 6, art. 1. 
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establishes that international copyright infringement is an 
issue of mutual international concern.174 Similarly, the trade-
related overtones of the 149-member TRIPS Agreement,175 as well 
as the Agreement’s protection of intellectual property, indicate 
the importance of international copyright protection as a matter 
of global policy.176 Indeed, more theoretically, to the extent 
promoting “dialogue between civilizations, cultures and peoples” 
is an objective of the community of nations,177 copyright 
 
174 Cf. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 (holding that the UNCLOS codifies 
customary international law because has been ratified by at 
least 149 nations). 
175 See TRIPS, supra note 7, preamble (declaring that a purpose 
of the TRIPS Agreement is to “reduce distortions and impediments 
to international trade, ... promote effective and adequate 
protection of intellectual property rights, and ... ensure that 
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights 
do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade”). 
176 See generally WTO | Understanding the WTO – Intellectual 
property: protection and enforcement, http://www.wto.int/english 
/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2007) 
(linking the international protection of intellectual property 
to increased technology transfer and societal improvement).  
177 See UNESCO Culture Sector, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/e 
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protection on an international basis serves an important 
facilitating function toward that end.178 
2.  The Universal Acceptance Requirement May be  
Satisfied Due to the Widespread Ratification     
of Berne and TRIPS 
 
Any normative principle of international law premised on 
the international community’s acceptance of the Berne Convention 
and the TRIPS Agreement should have no difficulty meeting the 
“universal acceptance” requirement.179 Presently, 162 nations are 
signatories to the Berne Convention,180 and 149 have accepted the 
TRIPS Agreement by virtue of their membership in the WTO.181 
Commentators have observed that all of the world’s “important” 
 
n/ev.php-URL_ID=2309&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2006) (declaring quixotically that “[t]he 
pursuit of dialogue between civilizations, cultures and peoples 
is crucial for the future of humanity”). 
178 Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (noting that 
the purpose of copyright law is to encourage the sharing and 
dissemination of ideas through a scheme of economic incentives). 
179 Cf. Nimmer, supra note 100, 17.01 (observing that 
multilateral copyright treaties, like the Berne Convention, have 
internationalized the practice of copyright law). 
180 See Berne, supra note 6. 
181 See TRIPS, supra note 7. 
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countries adhere to the multilateral treaty framework for 
copyright protection.182 In fact, with the exception of Russia,183 
each member of the United Nations Security Council is a member 
of both Berne and TRIPS.184 These two multilateral conventions 
provide a very strong basis upon which to assert components of 
normative international law.  
Recently, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, several plaintiffs 
sued a mining company under the ATS for various human rights 
violations, as well as environmental contamination.185 The Ninth 
 
182 See Nimmer, supra note 100, 17.01[B][1][a] (commenting that, 
since the United States in 1989, China in 1992, and Russia in 
1995 became parties to the Berne Convention, “all the world's 
important countries now belong to Berne”). 
183 See Gref reckons on completing Russian-American talks on 
Russia’s WTO accession by end of October, 2006, http://www.wto.r 
u/en/news.asp?msg_id=17999 (last visited Oct. 18, 2006) 
(providing information regarding Russia’s attempts to join the 
WTO). 
184 See Membership of the Security Council, http://www.un.org/sc/ 
members.asp (last visited Jan. 9. 2007) (providing a list of all 
ten members of the U.N. Security Council). 
185 See Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1073-75 (noting that the plaintiffs’ 
claims covered charged of racial discrimination, environmental 
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Circuit approved the plaintiffs’ environmental claim, which 
arose under customary international law as reflected by the 
UNCLOS.186 The claim was adequate, according to the court, 
because the UNCLOS was ratified by at least 149 nations, which 
was “sufficient for it to codify customary international law 
that can provide the basis of an [ATS] claim.”187 Both Berne and 
TRIPS have comparable numbers of adhering states,188 and thus 
should easily meet the requirement of universal acceptance. 
3.  Customary International Law is Binding on  
Signatories and thus Satisfies the Sense 
of Legal Obligation Requirement 
 
The Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement impose legal 
 
damages, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). 
186 Id. at 1078. See also United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1245 (providing the full text 
of the UNCLOS). 
187 Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078; see also supra note 8 (providing 
that multilateral agreements may constitute customary 
international law if they are intended for widespread acceptance 
and are in fact widely accepted). 
188 See Berne, supra note 6 (providing the official text of the 
162-member Berne Convention); TRIPS, supra note 7 (providing the 
official text of the 149-member TRIPS Agreement). 
58
obligations on their signatory nations.189 However, because 
neither the Berne Convention190 nor the TRIPS Agreement191 is 
self-executing in the United States, neither is directly binding 
in American courts.192 Thus, a plaintiff may not advance an ATS 
claim of copyright infringement by citing directly to the 
language of either agreement.193 Instead, the plaintiff must 
 
189 See generally Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States § 321 (stating that all multilateral 
agreements are “binding upon the parties to” them). 
190 See supra note 94 (describing the implementing legislation 
that stripped the Berne Convention of self-executive operation 
in the United States). 
191 See supra note 103 (outlining the implementing legislation 
that precluded self-execution for the TRIPS Agreement in the 
United States). 
192 See Jogi, 425 F.3d at 373 (noting that, if Vienna Convention 
were non-self-executing, the plaintiff’s claim based directly on 
that treaty would fail); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States § 111(3) (noting that U.S. 
courts are not bound by “non-self-executing” multilateral 
agreements unless such agreements have been legislatively 
implemented). 
193 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing subject matter 
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argue that Berne, TRIPS, and other international copyright 
agreements represent a codification of customary international 
law, under which international copyright infringement is 
prohibited.194 
Thus, to satisfy the legal obligation requirement of 
customary international law, the plaintiff must argue that the 
international norm prohibiting copyright infringement is 
internationally binding.195 There is an obvious circularity 
problem, however, in demonstrating that a new principle of 
customary international law is binding.196 That is, how could one 
 
jurisdiction for aliens’ tort claims that amount to violations 
of U.S. treaties). 
194 Cf. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 (holding that the plaintiffs’ 
UNCLOS claim may obtain ATS jurisdiction as a matter of 
customary international law, without discussing whether the 
UNCLOS is a self-executing treaty). 
195 See supra note 155 (providing the standard for claims of 
customary international law, which includes the legal obligation 
requirement). 
196 See Joshua Ratner, Back To The Future: Why a Return to the 
Approach of the Filartiga Court is Essential to Preserve the 
Legitimacy and Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 Colum. 
J.L. & Soc. Probs. 83, 104 (2002) (noting that norms are only 
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say that a principle is binding if no one has ever tried to 
enforce it? Therefore, it is no wonder that the Sosa court, when 
providing the standards for new ATS claims, did not impose a 
requirement that such claims be demonstrably binding.197 
Essentially, determining whether a claim of international, 
extraterritorial copyright infringement qualifies as a principle 
of customary international law will first require the issue to 
be resolved in court. Thus, Sosa is best read as imposing only 
specificity-of-definition and universality-of-acceptance 
standards, rather than an additional “legally binding” 
requirement.  
 4. Sosa’s Specificity Requirement May be       
Satisfied in Light of Post-Sosa Litigation 
 
In contrast to the previous three requirements, the 
specificity requirement, as established by Sosa, requires a more 
thorough analysis of the proposed characterization of normative 
international law. Indeed, this requirement has caused courts to 
 
“obligatory” for states once they have already been established 
as jus cogens or customary international law). 
197 See supra note 5 (outlining Sosa’s definitional specificity 
and universal acceptance requirements for new ATS claims based 
upon the law of nations). 
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dismiss ATS claims in numerous cases.198 Nevertheless, the global 
norm prohibiting the infringement of aliens’ copyrights is 
defined with adequate specificity to overcome the definitional 
standards imposed by Sosa.199 
Sosa demands that any prospective claim of modern customary 
international law have as much specificity as the three 18th 
century examples to which Blackstone referred.200 The Sosa court 
did not, however, offer much guidance as to how a modern 
principle of normative international law could compare to 
 
198 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (holding 
that “sexual violence” failed to measure up as sufficiently 
specific and accepted to form a principle of normative 
international law under the ATS); Abdullahi, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16126, at *37-38 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ ATS claims 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as insufficiently 
specific).  
199 See generally supra note 5 (describing Sosa’s specificity and 
universal adherence requirements for new ATS claims based upon 
the law of nations). 
200 See supra note 5 (providing the two standards imposed by the 
Sosa court for new ATS claims). 
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doctrinally dissimilar principles from the 18th century.201 
Nevertheless, ATS cases that have arisen after Sosa was decided 
provide illumination along the pathway of customary 
international law. 
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC202 several plaintiffs 
successfully brought ATS claims against two corporations 
alleging violations of the UNCLOS.203 According to the Ninth 
Circuit, the UNCLOS constituted customary international law 
because of its widespread international ratification.204 Just 
like the UNCLOS, the Berne Convention205 and TRIPS Agreement206 
201 See Harvard Leading Case, supra note 148, at 454 (noting that 
Sosa’s specificity and acceptance requirements are both vague, 
and potentially difficult to apply). 
202 See supra note 67 (providing a factual outline of the case). 
203 See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62; see also supra note 68 
(providing the official text of the UNCLOS). 
204 See id. (stating that, while the United States has not yet 
ratified the UNCLOS, it has signed it, and that the UNCLOS’s 
level of international acceptance qualifies it a principle of 
customary international law). 
205 See Berne, supra note 6, art. 36 (providing that each 
signatory state “undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its 
constitution, the measures necessary to ensure the application 
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call for adhering states to conform their laws to certain 
standards, rather than regulate private conduct.207 Therefore, 
upon a quick reading, neither the UNCLOS, Berne, nor TRIPS 
seemingly provide any enforceable rights to private parties as a 
matter of normative international law.208 Nonetheless, the 
UNCLOS’s requirements that adhering states adopt laws 
prohibiting environmental contamination209 did indeed form the 
 
of this Convention.” Upon each country’s accession to the 
Convention, the country must “be in a position under its 
domestic law to give effect to the provisions of this 
Convention.” 
206 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 1 (providing that signatory 
states “shall give effect to the provisions” of the TRIPS 
Agreement in a manner consistent with their domestic law). 
207 See supra note 94 (outlining the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act, under which no private party shall have a 
cause of action); supra note 103 (describing the implementing 
legislation of the WTO agreements, including TRIPS, under which 
private causes of action are denied). 
208 Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (expressing concern about the 
“possible collateral consequences” of creating private rights of 
action, derived from customary international law).  
209 See UNCLOS, supra note 68 (describing the requirements 
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basis of a claim of customary international law in Sarei by 
private plaintiffs against two private defendants.210 Evidently, 
the UNCLOS’s requirements for signatory states reflect an 
international condemnation of the underlying conduct that was 
prohibited on a domestic basis, and it was that condemnation 
that constituted a principle of customary international law.211 
In precisely the same manner, Berne and TRIPS, by their 
terms, impose requirements on adhering states rather than govern 
private conduct.212 Just as the UNCLOS’s implicit condemnation of 
environmental contamination was adequate to form a principle of 
customary international law upon which private litigants could 
rely, so should be the implicit condemnation of copyright 
infringement reflected in Berne and TRIPS.213 
imposed upon signatory states by the UNCLOS). 
210 Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62. 
211 Cf. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 (noting that the UNCLOS’s 
baseline provisions reflect principles of customary 
international law). 
212 See supra note 190 (referring to the state-oriented, rather 
than individual-oriented, character of Berne and TRIPS). 
213 Cf. infra note 203 (describing the private rights that are 
implicit in the Berne Convention’s provisions); infra note 204 
(referring to the “rights of authors” pursuant to the TRIPS 
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In another post-Sosa case, Jogi v. Voges,214 a seemingly 
state-oriented (rather than individual-oriented) treaty was 
found to provide a private litigant with a cause of action.215 
While in prison, the plaintiff was removed from the United 
States and sent to India, his homeland.216 The plaintiff asserted 
that, because he was not advised of his rights under the Vienna 
Convention217 to contact the Indian consulate for assistance, the 
law enforcement officers who dealt with him tortiously violated 
his rights under international law.218 The court held that, while 
the Vienna Convention is mainly an inter-state treaty, Article 
36 provides detained nationals with private rights of consular 
notification.219 The court’s decision relied principally on 
 
Agreement). 
214 Jogi, 425 F.3d 367. 
215 See id. 425 F.3d at 382 (holding that while “most parts of 
the Vienna Convention address only state-to-state matters, 
Article 36 confers individual rights on detained nationals”). 
216 Jogi, 425 F.3d at 369-70. 
217 See Vienna Convention, supra note 77 (providing the official 
text of the treaty). 
218 Jogi, 425 F.3d at 369-70. 
219 Jogi, 425 F.3d at 382. 
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specific language of Article 36 that implied private rights.220 
Analogously, Berne and TRIPS both single out private rights 
in exactly the same manner as the Vienna Convention. First, it 
is worth noting that Berne and TRIPS are treaties relating to 
“copyrights,” and as such, inherently deal with private rights 
in a way the Vienna Convention does not.221 As for the 
substantive provisions of Berne and TRIPS, Article 1 of Berne 
states that the group of nations adhering to it form a “Union 
for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary 
and artistic works.”222 Article 2 provides that copyright 
protections granted by signatory states, pursuant to Berne, 
“shall operate for the benefit of the author....”223 Under 
Article 5, “[a]uthors shall enjoy ... the rights which [other 
 
220 See supra note 80 (describing how, under Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention, consular authorities must receive 
notification of a detained national’s detention upon request, 
and that the arresting nation shall notify the detained 
individual of his rights). 
221 See id. (characterizing the Vienna Convention as concerned 
with consular relations and functions, the rights of consular 
personnel, and communications with host governments).  
222 See Berne, supra note 6, art. 1. 
223 See Berne, supra note 6, art. 2(6). 
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signatory states’] laws do now or may hereafter grant ..., as 
well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.”224 
There are numerous similar provisions in Berne.225 Likewise, 
Article 3 of TRIPS provides that signatory states “shall accord 
to the nationals” of other signatory states copyright protection 
equal to that granted to its own nationals.226 Under Article 11, 
signatory states “shall provide authors ... the right to 
authorize or to prohibit the commercial rental ... of originals 
or copies of their copyright [sic] works.”227 Article 14 grants 
“[p]roducers of phonograms ... the right to authorize or 
prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their 
phonograms.”228 Additionally, decisions from WTO-administered 
dispute settlement Panels have referred to both Berne and TRIPS 
 
224 See Berne, supra note 6, art. 5(1). 
225 See, e.g., Berne, supra note 6, art. 6bis(1) (providing that, 
in addition to an “author's economic rights,” he “shall have the 
right to claim authorship of the work” and protect against 
alterations made to it); see also Berne, supra note 6, art. 7(1) 
(determining the duration of an author’s copyright protection as 
lasting 50 years after his death). 
226 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 3(1) (emphasis added). 
227 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 11 (emphasis added). 
228 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 14(2) (emphasis added). 
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as treaties that confer private rights.229 Therefore, if a treaty 
concerned mostly with state-to-state conduct such as the Vienna 
Convention can be construed to generate private rights of action 
because of a few select references to the rights of individuals, 
the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement, which inherently 
concern private rights and refer to such rights repeatedly, 
should likewise be read to create private rights of action.  
 
IV.  Recommendations 
 If indeed a claim of international, extraterritorial 
copyright infringement may obtain ATS jurisdiction, determining 
the likely consequences becomes important.230 A wide range of 
 
229 See Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) (noting that in 
dispute settlement proceedings before the WTO, the complaining 
party has the burden of supporting its claims of violations of 
“the basic rights that have been provided under the copyright 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement,” and under the Berne 
Convention as incorporated by TRIPS. The Panel further 
recognized that Berne created “exclusive rights” for “[a]uthors 
of dramatic, dramatico-musical and musical works[.]”  
230 Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 (noting that courts should be 
cautious in expanding the substantive content of the federal 
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opinion and experience is necessary to properly assess the 
impact of such jurisdiction. To perform the assessment, the U.S. 
Copyright Office should work closely with Congress to receive 
and consider the views of all interested parties.  
A. The Intellectual Property Litigation Context 
The effects of ATS jurisdiction within the context of 
intellectual property litigation should undergo careful 
assessment. The views of American artists, businesses, 
consumers, state and federal courts, state and federal 
legislatures, and executive agencies are all relevant and 
potentially meaningful.231 The Copyright Office should have the 
 
common law, particularly in the area of foreign affairs, without 
guidance from the legislature). 
231 Cf. Eight Charged with Copyright Infringement for 
Distributing the Latest Star Wars Movie that was..., http://www. 
usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/valenteCharge.htm (last visited 
Jan 9, 2007) (detailing a criminal prosecution of eight 
individuals who illegally copied a movie, in which the parties 
of concern were the production company, websites, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Department of Justice); 
Recording Industry Association of America, http://www.riaa.com/i 
ssues/piracy/riaa.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (describing 
the recording industry’s interest in curbing music “piracy” and 
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responsibility of collecting the views of such parties, and 
orchestrating a study on the impact of ATS jurisdiction for 
international copyright infringement.232 Only with the benefit of 
the opinions and recommendations of such parties may the 
Copyright Office make thoughtful recommendations about the 
future utility of the ATS as a jurisdictional basis for 
international copyright litigation. 
B. The Economic Context 
 The Copyright Office should also explore the economic 
consequences of ATS jurisdiction for claims of international 
 
outlining steps it has currently undertaken in pursuance 
thereof); Motion Picture Association of America, http://www.mpaa 
.org/piracy.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (providing detailed 
information about global “piracy” of movies). 
231 See generally Background, infra Part II.D (describing the 
potential adverse economic effects of international copyright 
infringement). 
232 Cf. U.S. Copyright Office – Reports, http://www.copyright.gov 
/reports/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (providing a list of 
studies and reports that the Copyright Officer presently 
produces, including annual reports, strategic plans, and more 
particularized reports). 
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copyright infringement.233 In this connection, the views of the 
Department of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Treasury Department, and various business interest groups are 
important. Additionally, several business organizations that 
market copyrighted products have compiled substantial economic 
data related to the infringement of copyrights, which may prove 
probative.234 Among other issues, the Copyright Office should 
consider whether the economic benefits of permitting ATS 
jurisdiction outweigh the costs such jurisdiction would impose 
as a result of higher levels of litigation. 
 C. The Artistic Community 
 Thirdly, the Copyright Office should solicit the 
perspectives of those in the artistic communities whose work is 
 
233 See Background, infra Part II.D (describing the potential 
adverse economic effects of international copyright 
infringement). 
234 See, e.g., supra note 112 (providing economic data that was 
compiled by the Motion Picture Association relating to 
infringement of movies overseas); supra note 113 (summarizing 
the economic consequences of copyright infringement for the 
music recording industry, as supplied by the Recording Industry 
of America). 
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both protected and advanced by United States copyright law.235 
These individuals, and the groups that represent them, could 
offer important recommendations about the benefits of permitting 
the ATS to serve as a jurisdictional basis for claims of 
international copyright infringement. Similarly, international 
organizations that perform work in cultural fields may provide 
interesting insights about such jurisdiction from their own 
unique perspectives.236 
D. Collaboration with Congress 
 Once the Copyright Office completes its collection and 
assessment of the information submitted to it by interested 
individuals and entities, the Copyright Office should 
 
235 Cf. NAEA | About Us, http://www.naea-reston.org/aboutus.html 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (describing the history and purpose 
of the 59-year old artists’ organization, the National Art 
Education Association); WAA home page, http://www.artuk.co.uk/as 
soc/waa.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (outlining the mission 
of the World Artists Association, a global artists’ union). 
236 See generally Fact Sheet No.16 (Rev.1), The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu6/2/fs16.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2007) (describing the 
efforts and objectives related to cultural progress from a 
subsidiary organization with in the U.N.). 
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participate in a policy-making process led by Congress. The 
Copyright Office should submit its final assessment to Congress 
in an effort to provide needed insight in the event Congress 
decides that legislative action is needed.237 
Congress may act upon the Copyright Office’s final 
assessment in various ways. For instance Congress could amend 
the ATS to expressly prohibit its use in international copyright 
litigation.238 This would be a very narrowly conceived solution. 
By addressing only copyright litigation and nothing else, 
Congress may appear too selective in its legislation. Further, 
doing so would undermine the jurisprudential goal of ensuring 
predictability in the law.239 
Another alternative is to amend the ATS to declare that its 
reference to the “law of nations” excludes customary 
 
237 See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (stating that Congress’s 
views are welcome on the subject of the ATS, particularly 
because of the statute’s foreign policy implications). 
238 Cf. id. (noting that Congress may “occupy the field” of the 
ATS, and thereby remove the law of nations as a basis for claims 
made thereunder). 
239 Cf. Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 726 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (stating that, at least as a matter of personal tax 
liability, Congress favors predictability in the law). 
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international law based upon widespread ratification of 
multilateral agreements.240 This would have the effect of denying 
ATS jurisdiction for international copyright infringement 
claims, but would have collateral effects as well. Denying ATS 
jurisdiction on the basis of customary international law 
premised on multilateral agreements would certainly implicate 
other agreements that may otherwise give rise to jurisdiction 
under the ATS.241 
Alternatively, Congress may decide to strike the ATS from 
the United States Code altogether.242 Doing so may not be as 
drastic as it sounds, because the federal question jurisdiction 
statute already provides jurisdiction for violations of 
 
240 See generally Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (holding that 
the UNCLOS, a multilateral agreement, represents customary 
international law). 
241 See, e.g., Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 (determining that the 
UNCLOS, a multilateral agreement, is a source of customary 
international law that may provide private litigants the basis 
for an ATS action). 
242 Cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (observing that Congress may 
“explicitly” remove the law of nations as a basis for ATS 
claims). 
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customary international law.243 In fact, the only function of the 
ATS is perhaps to make clear federal court jurisdiction over 
claims of customary international law.244 
Whatever course of action Congress ultimately takes, the 
critical prerequisite to any congressional action is a complete 
process of information gathering led by the Copyright Office. 
The nature of an ATS claim of international, extraterritorial 
copyright infringement is quite complex, and the consequences of 
permitting such claims is uncertain.245 Only after gathering and 
 
243 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing federal district courts with 
jurisdiction over civil claims “under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States; see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 745 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (warning that the ATS may become 
surplusage under the majority’s analysis, because customary 
international law may rely on ordinary federal question 
jurisdiction if it is integrated into the federal common law). 
244 See Jogi, 425 F.3d at 373 (commenting that there is complete 
overlap between “treaty” both “law of nations” jurisdiction 
under the ATS and the federal question statute, and that the 
only point of “law of nations” jurisdiction under the ATS is 
possibly to make clear that such jurisdiction actually exists). 
245 See supra note 237 (noting that, without guidance from 
Congress, expanding the federal common law to include new ATS 
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considering a wealth of information from those in the copyright 
field, may Congress properly decide among the alternatives 
described above. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 This Comment assesses the potential for the Alien Tort 
Statute (“ATS”) to serve as a jurisdictional basis for claims of 
international, extraterritorial copyright infringement. It finds 
that the ATS may successfully provide jurisdiction for such 
claims, because of the high degree of specificity with which 
copyright infringement is defined by multilateral agreements and 
the widespread acceptance of such agreements by the 
international community. Consequently, claims of international 
copyright infringement may pass the two tests established by the 
Supreme Court in Sosa, and invoke subject matter jurisdiction in 
federal district courts. Given that the ATS may provide 
jurisdiction for claims of international, extraterritorial 
copyright infringement, the next step is assessing the likely 
consequences. A public policy inquiry, spearheaded by the 
Copyright Office, must address whether the ATS should serve as a 
jurisdictional basis for claims of international, 
extraterritorial copyright infringement. The Copyright Office 
 
claims should proceed cautiously). 
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should solicit the views of all interested parties, including 
those with particularly important perspectives from the legal, 
commercial, and artistic fields. Only with the benefit of the 
insights from these groups may the Copyright Office thoughtfully 
determine whether to maintain the ATS as a source of 
jurisdiction for international, extraterritorial copyright 
litigation.  
 
